Darwin-L Message Log 1: 106–140 — September 1993

Academic Discussion on the History and Theory of the Historical Sciences

Darwin-L was an international discussion group on the history and theory of the historical sciences, active from 1993–1997. Darwin-L was established to promote the reintegration of a range of fields all of which are concerned with reconstructing the past from evidence in the present, and to encourage communication among scholars, scientists, and researchers in these fields. The group had more than 600 members from 35 countries, and produced a consistently high level of discussion over its several years of operation. Darwin-L was not restricted to evolutionary biology nor to the work of Charles Darwin, but instead addressed the entire range of historical sciences from an explicitly comparative perspective, including evolutionary biology, historical linguistics, textual transmission and stemmatics, historical geology, systematics and phylogeny, archeology, paleontology, cosmology, historical geography, historical anthropology, and related “palaetiological” fields.

This log contains public messages posted to the Darwin-L discussion group during September 1993. It has been lightly edited for format: message numbers have been added for ease of reference, message headers have been trimmed, some irregular lines have been reformatted, and error messages and personal messages accidentally posted to the group as a whole have been deleted. No genuine editorial changes have been made to the content of any of the posts. This log is provided for personal reference and research purposes only, and none of the material contained herein should be published or quoted without the permission of the original poster.

The master copy of this log is maintained in the Darwin-L Archives (rjohara.net/darwin) by Dr. Robert J. O’Hara. The Darwin-L Archives also contain additional information about the Darwin-L discussion group, the complete Today in the Historical Sciences calendar for every month of the year, a collection of recommended readings on the historical sciences, and an account of William Whewell’s concept of “palaetiology.”

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DARWIN-L MESSAGE LOG 1: 106-140 -- SEPTEMBER 1993
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DARWIN-L
A Network Discussion Group on the
History and Theory of the Historical Sciences

Darwin-L@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu is an international network discussion group on
the history and theory of the historical sciences.  Darwin-L was established
in September 1993 to promote the reintegration of a range of fields all of
which are concerned with reconstructing the past from evidence in the present,
and to encourage communication among academic professionals in these fields.
Darwin-L is not restricted to evolutionary biology nor to the work of Charles
Darwin but instead addresses the entire range of historical sciences from an
interdisciplinary perspective, including evolutionary biology, historical
linguistics, textual transmission and stemmatics, historical geology,
systematics and phylogeny, archeology, paleontology, cosmology, historical
anthropology, historical geography, and related "palaetiological" fields.

This log contains public messages posted to Darwin-L during September 1993.
It has been lightly edited for format: message numbers have been added for ease
of reference, message headers have been trimmed, some irregular lines have been
reformatted, and error messages and personal messages accidentally posted to
the group as a whole have been deleted.  No genuine editorial changes have been
made to the content of any of the posts.  This log is provided for personal
reference and research purposes only, and none of the material contained herein
should be published or quoted without the permission of the original poster.
The master copy of this log is maintained in the archives of Darwin-L by
listserv@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu.  For instructions on how to retrieve copies of
this and other log files, and for additional information about Darwin-L, send
the e-mail message INFO DARWIN-L to listserv@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu.

Darwin-L is administered by Robert J. O'Hara (darwin@iris.uncg.edu), Center for
Critical Inquiry in the Liberal Arts and Department of Biology, University of
North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina 27412 U.S.A., and it
is supported by the Center for Critical Inquiry, University of North Carolina
at Greensboro, and the Department of History and the Academic Computing Center,
University of Kansas.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:106>From LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu  Sun Sep 12 19:28:09 1993

Date: Sun, 12 Sep 93 19:28 CDT
From: J. Luke Matthews <LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: RE>Re- Evolution in linguis
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

it's interesting how the name Lamarck comes up anytime the word
'intentionality' comes up when people talk about evolution. Changes in culture,
society aren't different from changes in the non-human parts of the
universe...their's plenty of intentionality out there too...after all (and this
is admittedly an exaggeration) one reason there are no jellyfish on
mountaintops is because jellyfish just hate montane environments. Animals and
plants, monera, protista, and whatever else are squirming around out there do
have some capacity to make some (perhaps severely limited) choices.

And of course, there's plenty of irrational and nonrational nonintentionality
among us ever so sapient humans.

J. Luke Matthews
University of Wisconsin/Madison
LUKEMATT@MACC.WISC.EDU

 --til now, only lurking....

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:107>From DEWAR%UCONNVM.BITNET@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU  Sun Sep 12 20:48:18 1993

Date: Sun, 12 Sep 1993 21:35:27 -0500 (EST)
From: DEWAR%UCONNVM.BITNET@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU
Subject: Re: Evolution in linguistics?
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

This is a response to Joseph Raben's request about a comparison between lingist
ic and biological evolutionary processes.  The place to start is Edward Sapir's
 1921 book entitled "Language".  Sapir was quite possibly the smartest anthropo
logist of the 20th century, and he devotes a couple of chapters to considering
the processes of language change, and a full chapter to considering the relatio
n of changes in language, culture and race. He describes language change interm
s that I at least find difficult to view as metaphoric extensions of evoluton b
y natural selection.  But no matter if I am right, his ample discussion (aimed
not at linguists but at the rest of us) provides food for thought.

Robert Dewar
Anthropology, University of Connecticut

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<1:108>From tclarke@uoguelph.ca  Sun Sep 12 22:44:14 1993

Date: Sun, 12 Sep 1993 23:29:40 -0400 (EDT)
From: Tom Clarke <tclarke@uoguelph.ca>
Subject: Re: RE>Re- Evolution in linguis
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Sun, 12 Sep 1993, J. Luke Matthews wrote:

> it's interesting how the name Lamarck comes up anytime the word
> 'intentionality' comes up when people talk about evolution. Changes in
> culture, society aren't different from changes in the non-human parts of
> the universe...their's plenty of intentionality out there too...after all
> (and this is admittedly an exaggeration) one reason there are no jellyfish
> on mountaintops is because jellyfish just hate montane environments. Animals
> and plants, monera, protista, and whatever else are squirming around out
> there do have some capacity to make some (perhaps severely limited) choices.

 Jellyfish aren't too keen on the cold either, but I keep finding them in
 that local dribble, the speed river.

   I believe I understand what you mean by the term intentionality -
 that the individuals within the population have some capacity to choose
their own destiny.  That isn't particularly lamarkian - intentionality is
 observed in sexual selection when by means of choice certain alleles
 are favored in the population over others.

  It only becomes lamarkian when a purpose external to the system
 is placed on the system... selective breeding, for example, is lamarkian.
 Cultural evolution, I would think, would follow a darwinian system,
 with ideas as the base unit instead of alleles.  However, certian theories
 of cultural evolution, eg Marxism, are definately lamarkian, proposing
 that human culture is following a pattern or heading towards some
 form of utopia.

   -Anax-

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:109>From PGRIFFITHS@gandalf.otago.ac.nz  Sun Sep 12 23:02:59 1993

To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: pgriffiths@gandalf.otago.ac.nz
Organization: University of Otago
Date: 13 Sep 1993 16:07:59 GMT+1200
Subject: Re: Evolution in linguistics?

Joseph Raben asks about linguistics and evolution.

The following piece is about to appear.

 D Penny, E.E. Watson, & M.A. Steel, "Trees from languages and genes are
very similar",  Systematic Biology, XLII (1993):  in press.

There is interesting work of this sort going on by a range of New Zealand
researchers.

Paul Griffiths

Also

L.L Cavalli-Sforza et al, "Reconstruction of Human Evolution: Bringing
Together Genetic, Archeological and Linguistic Data" , Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, LXXXV (1988): 6002-6.

Introducing myself.  I am a philosopher with interests in psychology,
evolutionary biology and their intersections, and in the life-sciences
generally.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:110>From danny@orthanc.cs.su.OZ.AU  Mon Sep 13 00:53:10 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 15:54:03 +1000
From: danny@orthanc.cs.su.OZ.AU (Danny Yee)
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Book Review - The Dynamics of Evolution

The Dynamics of Evolution -
The Punctuated Equilibrium Debate in the Natural and Social Sciences
(Eds) Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson
Cornell University Press 1992
pp. 325
[evolutionary biology, anthropology, politics ]

The punctuated equilibrium debate is one of the few controversies within
evolutionary biology that have come to popular notice.  No doubt this is
largely a result of the popular writings and high profile of Stephen Jay
Gould, the theory's leading proponent.  _The Dynamics of Evolution_,
coming twenty years after the paper by Gould and Eldredge that
originally sparked the debate, is a retrospective evaluation of the
theory and the surrounding debate, pitched at a level that makes it
approachable by anyone with a general background in evolutionary
biology.  (Perhaps someone who has read the popular writings on evolution
of Dawkins and Gould and wants to know what the status of the debate
is.)  Some of the first six essays in this book (on the biological theory
of punctuated equilibrium) will themselves be important works in the
ongoing debate; as well as these _The Dynamics of Evolution_ contains
another six essays on implications for the social sciences (the editors
themselves are political scientists rather than biologists).

-

Punctuated equilibrium is the idea that "most" evolutionary change
happens in geologically "brief" speciation events separated by long
periods of "stasis".  As the essays in this book demonstrate there is a
great deal of uncertainty about what exactly this means and whether it
is true or not (hence my scare quotes).

The opening essay by Ernst Mayr is a broad attempt to explain what the
theory of punctuated equilibrium is and what the debate has been about.
Mayr describes the different things that have been labelled "punctuated
equilibrium", with a concern to clarify some points of uncertainty.  His
view is generally very favourable; apart from some of the more extreme
ideas regarding saltationism (production of new species by large single
mutations) which he sees Gould as having toyed with for a few years, he
believes that most of the claims associated with punctuated equilibrium
are in fact either true or in the process of being tested, and that the
issues involved are significant.  However he stresses that punctuated
equilibrium does not "transcend" Darwinism in any way, and is in fact
solidly in the Darwinian tradition.

In the second essay we have a discussion of punctuated equilibrium
"straight from the horses mouth"; Stephen Jay Gould himself explains the
origins of punctuated equilibrium, answers some of its detractors'
arguments, and considers some of its wider implications.  As the editors
say in the introduction, so closely is Gould associated with punctated
equilibrium that this is almost an "apologia pro vita sua".  His ideas
are clearly less extreme than some of the other essays in this volume
seem to think, and though he claims that there have been no major
changes in his ideas on the subject, this seems to be rather arguable.

Next up Steven Stanley presents some of the empirical evidence
supporting punctuated equilibrium.  This includes evidence for effective
stasis in some lineages and evidence for extremely rapid speciation in
others.  It is extremely hard to evaluate this evidence, given the
sampling problems inherent in choosing lineages to study that Stanley
himself points out, but there seems little doubt that there is evidence
for punctuated equilibrium in evolution and that further work will make
it clearer exactly how important it actually is.

An essay by Eldredge, the other founder of punctuated equilibrium, is
largely about hierarchical evolution rather than punctuated equilibrium.
He also makes a few very general comments about possible metaphorical
application in the social sciences (looking forward to the second
section of the book).

The only really dissenting voice in this discussion is that of Antoni
Hoffman.  His essay is a general attack on the theory of punctuated
equilibrium; he claims that the weak form (that rates of evolutionary
change vary) is trivial and says nothing that wasn't known to Darwin,
the strong from (macromutations and saltationism) is false, and the
moderate form (widespread stasis in evolutionary lineages) is
untestable.  He does admit that punctuated equilibrium has had heuristic
value in sparking debate and suggesting research.  Again it is evident
that there is confusion as to whether (and how strongly) Gould actually
pushed saltationism, but it is clear that he no longer does so; hence
criticism of the "strong" version of punctuated equilibrium is now
peripheral to the main debate.  Given the palaeontological evidence
presented by Stanley and Gould in this volume (and by others elsewhere),
Hoffman's claim that the moderate version is untestable seems hard to
sustain, although it is clear that testing it is more complicated than
was at first thought.

The final essay in this section is by the philosopher Michael Ruse, who
has changed his original negative opinion of punctuated equilibrium and
now considers it to have many of the characteristics of a paradigm
shift.  He concentrates his attention on the work of Stephen Jay Gould,
and has some particularly interesting things to say about the
relationship between punctuated equilibrium and Gould's position on
other issues (such as his Marxism, his aversion to sociobiology, his
Jewishness, etc.).  Ruse's conclusion is that the main influence on
Gould's thinking is not any of these in particular, but his general
background in European philosophy, and in particular in a biological
tradition stretching back to Goethe that stresses form rather than
function.

-

The second section, titled "Implications for the Behavioural Sciences",
begins with an essay by Kenneth Boulding on "Punctuationism in Societal
Evolution".  This is basically a collection of comments on broad
similarities between biological and social systems, with some reference
to "punctuationism".  It is far too vague to be interesting; most of what
it says is either trivially true or so sweepingly general that truth is
rather irrelevant.  A couple of the statements about biological evolution
are worded in such a way as to make me slightly queasy; it is not
entirely clear that the author understands the Central Dogma of
molecular genetics and how its existence means there are fundamental
differences between biological evolution and societal evolution.

Susan Cachel's "Punctuated Equilibrium and Evolutionary Anthropology" is
rather peripheral to punctuated equilibrium, being an attack on the
misuse of cladistic systematics in palaeoanthropology.  (She thinks an
approach stressing evolutionary ecology, morphological change, etc. is
more useful than one based purely on classification and construction of
phylogenetic trees.)  At any rate, though punctuated equilibrium is often
coupled with cladistic systematics, it seems to me that the two are very
uneasy bedfellows, and so her whole argument has little to do with the
punctuated equilibrium debate.

Allan Mazur looks at the evolution of human social behaviour.  He argues
for a methodology based on progressive changes throughout the order
primates.  (Which seems to assume some ideal of progress as well as
gradualist change.)  He doesn't think there is enough evidence to decide
whether punctuated events are important in human evolution or not.  On a
similar note Brian Gladue argues that the punctuated equilibrium debate
is irrelevant to psychobiology.  The example he considers is
homosexuality.

The last two essays are on links between the punctuated equilibrium
debate and politics.  Glendon Schubert looks at parallels between
catastrophism in evolution and in politics, with human effects on
biological systems (imminent ecological disaster) as a link.

Roger Masters looks at links between biological and political theories
in the history of philosophy.  He looks at Aristotle, Empedocles and
Lucretius, and at Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx.  His conclusion is that,
since amongst them they hold all possible combinations of views on
gradualism/punctuationism, it seems unlikely that either scientific
position can be invalidated because of its proponents political beliefs.
However I remain entirely unconvinced that even a perfect correlation
between gradualist (or punctuationist) political beliefs and the
corresponding evolutionary ideas would in fact have any consequences for
biological theory, which is what Masters seems to be saying.

In general I was a bit disappointed by the essays in the second section.
I would have liked to have seen something on parallels between species
and cultures (the controversy over whether species are "real" entities
in evolutionary theory is arguably considerably better formulated than
arguments about the reality of cultures in anthropology), and between
evolution and cultural change, perhaps from an anthropological
viewpoint.  It seems to me that a punctuated model of human evolution
could have important consequences; even if there is not enough data to
say anything definite a bit of wild theorising wouldn't have gone amiss.
(For example, is the "aquatic ape" theory compatible with punctuated
speciation of homo sapiens?)

-

Some of the essays in _The Dynamics of Evolution_ were a bit
disappointing, but they are all interesting and some of them are likely
to be extremely important.  Anyone interested in the punctuated
equilibrium debate will want to read this book.

Danny Yee (danny@cs.su.oz.au)
12/9/93

  -------------------------------------------------------
  this review may by requested from any Internet site via
$ finger 'books=The_Dynamics_of_Evolution%danny@orthanc.cs.su.oz.au'

  a list of my other book reviews may be obtained with
$ finger 'books%danny@orthanc.cs.su.oz.au'

  and individual reviews extracted similarly
$ finger 'books=Title_From_Index%danny@orthanc.cs.su.oz.au'
  ---------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:111>From msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu  Mon Sep 13 08:00:19 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 08:02:45 -0600 (CDT)
From: Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
Subject: Re: Evolution in linguistics?
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Sun, 12 Sep 1993, pgriffiths@gandalf.otago.ac.nz wrote:

> D Penny, E.E. Watson, & M.A. Steel, "Trees from languages and genes are
> very similar",  Systematic Biology, XLII (1993):  in press.

The phylogenetic "tree" is a linguistic model which has profound impacts
upon cognition during the 'making' of evolutionary scientists. It is
virtually impossible to avoid visualizations of evolution in "tree" forms
no matter what books one reads in college. Because language is an active
rather than passive element in the formation of cognitive structures, "trees"
tend to predispose interpreters of fossil records toward more trees. Thinking
of evolutionary systematics without a tree becomes almost as difficult as
imagining writing without a word processor. 8*}

Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
International Studies Program
Stillman College

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:112>From LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu  Mon Sep 13 10:09:47 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 10:09 CDT
From: J. Luke Matthews <LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: RE>Re- Evolution in linguis
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Anax -- true enough, i agree with you that so much of what we have inherited
from the late 19 century and early part of this century regarding 'evolution',
is more-or-less metaphysical. That is, nature, society, and jellyfish are
talked about as if we were all striving, yearning towards some platonic ideal.
In "standard" Darwinian theory, I believe that one place that the metaphysic
may be lurking is in the idea of adaptation. Think about the funny ways in
which we talk about niches for example...we define niches by the organisms that
reside in them , yet we talk about animals, plants, etc...adapting to them.

		Yours, fighting metaphysics wherever it's found,

		J. Luke Matthews
	LUKEMATT@MACC.WISC.EDU

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:113>From mayerg@cs.uwp.edu  Mon Sep 13 11:28:46 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 10:42:06 -0500 (CDT)
From: Gregory Mayer <mayerg@cs.uwp.edu>
Subject: Sewall Wright & linguistics
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

	I've been much interested in the references and discussion on the
study of language evolution and the study of biological evolution.  It may
be of interest to record that Sewall Wright was also interested in
language evolution.
	Wright (1889-1988), for those unfamiliar with him, was (and is)
one of the most influential figures in evolutionary biology.  Along with
Haldane and Fisher, he is one of the triumvirate that reconciled Mendelian
genetics with natural selection and thus began the evolutionary synthesis
that is the historical progenitor of our present views.  Wright's interest
in language evolution is described W.B. Provine's magnificent intellectual
biography _Sewall Wright and Evolutionary Biology_ (University of Chicago
Press, 1986).  Wright's interest is worth mentioning here not only for the
sake of those who are not evolutionary biologists, but even these
biologists, who are quite familiar with Provine's book, may not be aware
of it, as there is no entry for "language", "linguistics", "philology",
etc. in Provine's index.

	Provine writes:

	"Sewall began to use his knowledge of Greek... and other languages
[Latin, German]....he read an article On Grimm's law.... He became
fascinated by the evolution of the Indo-European languages and began to
keep notebooks on cognate words and grammatical forms....He literally
filled a number of notebooks with these philological endeavors.
	This interest in philology indicates an early and deep fascination
with the evolution of patterns.  How languages become transformed over
time, and perhaps branched out to become several languages, was often
analogized to processes of evolution in nature by late-nineteenth-century
intellectuals." (p.14)

	Provine quotes Wright as follows:

	"Father..was sometimes sarcastic about my enthusiasms, especially
that for the evolution of the Indo-European languages..." (a
recollection by Wright in 1978; p.17)

	It is important to note that Wright engaged in this activity in
high school.  Provine records no further references by Wright to language
evolution, either published or unpublished, but it might be interesting to
reread some of Wright's work with this early interest in mind.

Gregory C. Mayer
mayerg@cs.uwp.edu

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:114>From msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu  Mon Sep 13 22:17:31 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 22:20:18 -0600 (CDT)
From: Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
Subject: Re: A reply to Ramsden
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Wed, 8 Sep 1993, Peter Ramsden wrote:

> I guess you missed the point.  I didn't want to know how you test a
> taxonomy - I want to know how test your proposition that some taxonomy is
> independent of human perception.  You may also want to be a bit more
> careful about confusing the concept of perception with the concept of
> will.  Just because I create a perception of something doesn't mean that I
> "will into existence" the phenomenon I'm perceiving, does it?  A bit more
> care in throwing around labels like 'science' and 'theology' wouldn't be
> out of place either

I think it would useful at this point in the thread to distinguish
"perception" from "cognition". As most cognitive theorists as well as
physiological psychologists use the term, "perception" is relatively
cultureless until linguistic tags begin to segment and order physical
phenomena. A perceiver never "creates" a perception, but the perceiver's
cortex might modify the perception in order to force it into a learned
category. "Will" is such a higher order process of mentation than either
perception or cognitive processing that I find it difficult to use in this
context. Perhaps theology and/or psychology would be a good place to leave
such notions as 'willing phenomena into existence.'

But then again, cognitive models such as the ubiquitous phylogenetic tree
predispose analysts to interpret evolutionary continuity in terms of
discontinuous 'branches,' 'clades' and 'species.' "Willingly?" 8*}

Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
Stillman College

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:115>From minaka@ss.niaes.affrc.go.jp  Mon Sep 13 22:26:52 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 12:20:47 +0900
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: minaka@ss.niaes.affrc.go.jp
Subject: Re: Trees of history bibliography (long)

>WORKING INTERDISCIPLINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY: 'TREES OF HISTORY' IN SYSTEMATICS,
>HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS, AND STEMMATICS.  Version of February 1993. Compiled by
>Robert J. O'Hara, Center for Critical Inquiry in the Liberal Arts and
>Department of Biology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro,
>North Carolina 27412-5001, U.S.A.  (Email: RJOHARA@iris.uncg.edu.)

I'd like to add several theoretical papers to Robert J. O'Hara's _Trees of
history bibliography (1&2)_ on Sept 11. My selection focuses on _mathematics_
of phylogenetic trees including reticulated graphs. Some of the papers
listed below could be added to O'Hara's bibliography.

(1) Mathematics of trees
Abe, J.M. & N. Papavero 1992. Teoria intuitiva dos conjuntos. (In Portuguese)
Makron Books, McGraw-Hill, Sao Paulo. [Textbook on set-theory with special
reference to phylogenetic systematics]

Dress, A. & A. von Haeseler, eds. 1990. Trees and hierarchical structures.
Proceedings of a conference held at Bielefeld, FRG, Oct.5-9th, 1987. Lecture
Notes in Biomathematics 84, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

Foulds, L.R. 1992. Graph theory applications. Springer-Verlag, New York.
[Graph theory applied to phylogenetic trees]

Gregg, J.R. 1954. The language of taxonomy. An application of symbolic
logic to the study of classificatory systems. Columbia University Press,
New York. [Logical analysis of classificatory systems, _NOT_ of phylogeny]

Papavero, N. & J.M. Abe 1993. Funciones que preserven orden y categorias
lineanas. Publicaciones Especiales del Museo de Zoologia (Universidad
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico), 5:39-74. (In Spanish) [Partial-order theory
of classification]

Papavero, N. & J. Llorente-Bousquets, eds. 1993. Principia taxonomica. Una
introduccion a los fundamentos logicos, filosoficos y metodologicos de las
escuelas de taxonomia biologica. Volumen I. Conceptos basicos de la
taxonomia: una formalizacion. (In Spanish) Universidad Nacional Autonoma de

Mexico. [Order-theoretical formalization of taxonomic and phylogenetic
concepts]

Thomason, R.H. 1969. Species, determinates and natural kinds. Nous, 3:95-
101. [Set-theoretical analysis of classificatory systems]

Wang, F.K., D.S. Richards & P Winter 1992. The Steiner tree problem.
Annals of Discrete Mathematics 53, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[Includes a chapter on estimating phylogenetic trees]

(2) Reticulated trees
Delattre, P. 1988. Sur la recherche des filiations en phylogenese.
(In French) Revue Internationale de Systemique, 2:479-504.

Funk, V.A. 1985. Phylogenetic patterns and hybridization.
Annals of Missouri Botanical Garden, 72:681-715.

McDade, L. 1990. Hybrids and phylogenetic systematics I: Patterns of
character expression in hybrids and their implications for cladistic
analysis. Evolution, 44:1685-1700.

McDade, L. 1992. Hybrids and phylogenetic systematics II: The impact of
hybrids on cladistic analysis. Evolution, 46:1329-1346.

Minaka, N. 1990. Cladogram and reticulated graphs: A proposal for graphic
representation of cladistic structures. Bulletin of Biogeographic Society
of Japan, 45:1-10.

Nelson, G. 1983. Reticulation in cladograms. Pp.105-111 in N.I. Platnick &
V.A. Funk, eds. _Advances in cladistics, volume 2_ Columbia University
Press, New York.

Wagner, W.H.,Jr 1983. Reticulistics: The recognition of hybrids and their role
in cladistics and classification. Pp. 63-79 in N.I. Platnick & V.A. Funk,
eds. _Advances in cladistics, volume 2_ Columbia University Press, New
York.

Wareham, H.T. 1993. On the computational complexity of inferring evolutionary
trees. Technical Report #9301, Memorial Unversity of Newfoundland.
[With a discussion on reticulated trees]

(3) Definitions of trees
Jepsen, G.L. 1944. Phylogenetic trees. Transactions of New York Academy of
Sciences, Series 2, 6:81-92.

Minaka, N. 1987. Branching diagrams in cladistics: Their definitions and
implications for biogeographic analyses. Bulletin of Biogeographic Society
of Japan, 42:65-78.

Ohta, Kuniyoshi 1993. My view on phylogenetics. (In Japanese) Panmixia
(Systematic Entomology Discussion Group of Japan), 9:1-25. [History of
tree diagrams since early 19th century]

Sluys, R. 1984. The meaning and implications of genealogical tree diagrams.

Zeitschrift fur zoologische Systematik und Evolutionsforschung, 22:1-8.

(3) Historical linguistics
Barthelemy, J.P. & A. Guenoche 1991. Trees and proximity representations.
John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. English translation of _Les Arbres et les
representations des proximites_ (1988, Masson, Paris). [Graph-theory and
combinatorics of phylogenetic trees of languages]

Hoenigswald, H.M. 1973. Studies in formal historical linguistics. D. Reidel,
Dordrecht. [_Cladistics_ of linguistic genealogy]

(4) Stemmatics
Lee, A.R. 1990. BLUDGEON: A blunt instrument for the analysis of
contamination in textual traditions. Pp. 261-292 in Y. Choueka, ed.
_Computers in literary and linguistic research, volume 3_ Champion-
Slatkine, Paris. [A computer software for stemmatics]

Ragan, M.A. & A.R. Lee 1992. Making phylogenetic sense of biochemical and
 morphological diversity among the protists. Pp. 432-441 in E.C. Dudley,
ed. _The unity of evolutionary biology_ Dioscorides Press, Portland.
[An application of Lee's BLUDGEON to systematic biology]

_____
Nobuhiro Minaka
*********************** Nobuhiro Minaka **********************
* Laboratory of Statistics, Division of Information Analysis *
* National Institute of Agro-Environmental Sciences          *
* ADDRESS: Kannon-dai 3-1-1, Tsukuba, Ibaraki305, Japan      *
* PHONE: 0298-38-8222;   FAX: 0298-38-8199                   *
* E-mail:  minaka@niaes.affrc.go.jp  [Internet]              *
**************************************************************

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:116>From msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu  Mon Sep 13 22:48:53 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 1993 22:51:40 -0600 (CDT)
From: Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
Subject: Re: RE>Re- Evolution in linguis
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Sun, 12 Sep 1993, John Wilkins wrote:
> Two issues concern me:
>
> 1. How much is cultural evolution REALLY affected by the so-called
> intentionality of social agents? Does this really introduce a lamarckian
> element (I think not)

The phrasing of your question suggests to me that you regard "cultural
evolution" as a "given" process. The monolithic view of social darwinism
is now a remote 'racial' memory, having been replaced by its very distant
decendants, "universal" and "multilinear" evolutionism. Both are oriented
toward the use of energy in food production, and both are mainly applicable
to cultural systems which no longer exist. In my view, there are certainly
no "Lamarckian" influences underlying more recent theories of cultural
evolution.

> 2. What are the close analogies and the disanalogies between cultural and
> biological evolution (Gould, eg, thinks that the term "evolution" ought to be
> restricted to biology -- I think because he thinks cultural change is a
> directed and staged process).

I share the thought you attribute to Gould. I seldom find theories of cultural
evolution to be very useful, either to explain well-documented cases of
culture change or to analyze ongoing change processes as they occur in
modern cultures. The "multilinear" model of Julian Steward, with its central
concept of "cultural ecology," is more interesting to me than the energy-based
constructs of the "universalists" after Leslie White, but neither of these
modern cultural evolution theories share essential analogies with biolgical
evolution to a degree which justifies labelling them as "evolutionary."

Of course, you will find many other anthropologists and archeologists who
disagree with my thoughts on the utility of cultural evolutionary models.
But this is perhaps enough to keep the thread alive . . . .

Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
Stillman College

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:117>From WILLS@macc.wisc.edu  Mon Sep 13 22:50:51 1993

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 93 22:51 CDT
From: Jeffrey Wills <WILLS@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: folktales and texts
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Self-introduction: I am a classicist and historical linguist (Indo-Europeanist)
with a general interest in the formalization of the history of language and
language-bearing artifacts.

	The interconnections between biological and linguistic history are well
known, but it is wonderful to see textual history receiving more attention. In
addition to stemmatics (manuscript history), Peter has included the history of
writs, and I would like to mention folktales/folkloric narratives.  To
non-specialists the names of Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm are less associated with
Grimm's Law than with Grimm's Fairy Tales. The 19th century burst of work in
reconstructing Indo-European linguistics was accompanied by parallel (but less
formalized) work in Indo-European story and myth. The age of Victorian
collectors led to the age of Scandinavian taxonomists (shades of Linnaeus?) and
the Aarne-Thompson Motif-Index we have today. Historical linguistics has been
out of fashion for over a generation due to the Chomskian revolution, but
efforts at reconstructing folktale "histories" became suspect much earlier (not
without reason, considering previous work), but I think the questions are still
valid, even the methods are difficult.

	For the purposes of this list, I am struck by some work of C.W. von
Sydow (from his *Selected Papers on Folklore*).  He has a 1932 paper "Om
traditionsspridning" (="On the Spread of Tradition") following up on the
earlier debate between migration and inheritance theories in which he says
"scholars have failed to study the biology of tradition" and discusses "active"
and "passive" bearers. The title of his 1934 "Geography and Folk-Tale
Oicotypes" explicitly uses a botanical term. As he explains:

	"In the science of botany *oicotype* is a term used to denote a
hereditary plant-variety adapted to a certain milieu . . . through natural
selection amongst hereditary dissimilar entities of the same species. When then
in the field of traditions a widely spread tradition, such as a tale or a
legend [i.e. a sagn], forms special types through isolation inside and
suitability for certain culture districts, the term oicotype can also be used
in the science of ethnology and folklore."

In another passages he discusses the introduction of new elements into the
sequence of a folktale in a way which might remind some of hybrids and genetic
codes (the history of "sequences" themselves in folklore theory is a separate
topic):

	"If we let K signify what is common to both oicotypes, then they have
become separate from one another by the Slav adding the motives a, b, c, while
the Indo-Iranian has instead added the motives p,q,r. The old Egyptian version
has K+abc+pqr+xyz. In the whole of its composition the old Egyptian variant is
unlike anything that we know of Egyptian folktale production, and is typically
Indo-European . . . . Both oicotypes must have developed before 1300 B.C. Two
traditors, one from each direction, met and told one another the tale. One
introduced the other oicotype's peculiar features into his own version, and in
this enlarged form told the tale to an Egyptian scribe, who wrote it down with
his own additions."  --as you can see, he pictures this transmission as related
to manuscript transmission.

Before one can engage in a proper study of folktales, though, von Sydow wants a
better taxonomy (fuller than Aarne-Thomson that is).  In the 1937 "Popular
Prose Traditions and Their Classification" we read:

	"My demand for a natural scientific system is therefore not a negatively
critical demand, but concerns a purely positive study of tales. We must first
of all decide what tales are closely related and then place them in natural
groups, greater and smaller. It is these groups which ought to be studied, and
it is necessary to discover the laws which govern the different groups, their
origin and development, their use and distribution. . . . Just as a zoologist
cannot without reservation apply the scientific results obtained at from the
study of bats to elephants or whales, so the student of tradition . . .etc."
And he goes on to discuss the categorization of animal tales as his prime
example.

	Jeffrey Wills
	Dept. of Classics, Univ. of Wisconsin
	wills@macc.wisc.edu

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:118>From DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu  Tue Sep 14 09:28:43 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 10:34:52 -0400 (EDT)
From: DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu
Subject: September 14 -- Today in the Historical Sciences
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Organization: University of NC at Greensboro

SEPTEMBER 14 -- TODAY IN THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES

1769: FRIEDRICH WILHELM HEINRICH ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT born at Berlin,
Germany.  He will become one of the most wide-ranging and celebrated
scientists of his day, best known for his work in geography, particularly
_Kosmos_ (1845-1862).  His older brother Wilhelm will become a linguist
and a founder of the University of Berlin.

1791: FRANZ BOPP is born at Mainz.  He will become one of the founders of
comparative linguistics, and will publish beginning in 1833 _Vergleichende
Grammatik des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Littauischen,
Gothischen und Deutschen_, the first comprehensive comparative grammar of
the Indo-European languages.

Today in the Historical Sciences is a feature of Darwin-L@ukanaix.cc.
ukans.edu, a network discussion group on the history and theory of the
historical sciences.  E-mail darwin@iris.uncg.edu for more information.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:119>From ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu  Tue Sep 14 12:55:07 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 14:01:33 -0500
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu (Jeremy John Ahouse)
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change

>On Sun, 12 Sep 1993, J. Luke Matthews wrote:
>
>   I believe I understand what you mean by the term intentionality -
> that the individuals within the population have some capacity to choose
> their own destiny.  That isn't particularly lamarkian - intentionality is
> observed in sexual selection when by means of choice certain alleles
> are favored in the population over others.
>
>  It only becomes lamarkian when a purpose external to the system
> is placed on the system... selective breeding, for example, is lamarkian.
> Cultural evolution, I would think, would follow a darwinian system,
> with ideas as the base unit instead of alleles.  However, certian theories
> of cultural evolution, eg Marxism, are definately lamarkian, proposing
> that human culture is following a pattern or heading towards some
> form of utopia.
>
>   -Anax-

    I kept expecting someone to respond to this.  But so far no one
has.  Selective breeding may be different than what dogs might experience
without breeders but it isn't "Lamarkian."  Not if by Lamarckian we mean
the transmission of acquired characteristics.  Language (and many other
learnable cultural traits) are almost certainly transmissable as acquired
in the life of the members of the previous generation.  The big question
that Weissman's doctrine (germ plasm is separate from the somatic tissue)
responds to is that information flows from genotype to phenotype (and there
is no way back).  And this was subsequently reconfigured as molecular
biology's central dogma of DNA -> RNA -> Protein.

    Lots of organismal biologists have had a hard time with what the
central dogma does to traits (making them coextenisive proteins).  (And
rightly they should.)  But in this discussion, we should be clear that
there are explanations that insist on variance of the traits being selected
and this selection shifting the mean (or other statistics of the trait
distribution) and other explanations that allow advantages that are accrued
or manufactured during a lifetime to be passed along.  Mixing these two
approaches is surely necessary (in Biology, Linguistics, etc...).  But I
think we miss something if we conclude that ideas, language, aesthetic
sensibilities don't have the extra-Darwinian feature of being able to be
transmitted as acquired.

    - Jeremy

p.s. Intro: Interests in Evolution, Immunology, Mathematical Modeling, and
Phil of Method.

    :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
    Jeremy John Ahouse
    Biology Dept. & Center for Complex Systems
    Brandeis University
    Waltham, MA 02254-9110

    (617) 736-4954
    email: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu
    Mail from Mac by Eudora 1.3.1 RIPEM/PGP accepted.

    "Si un hombre nunca se contradice, sera porque nunca dice nada"
      - Miguel de Unamuno

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:120>From tclarke@uoguelph.ca  Tue Sep 14 16:04:05 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 15:32:09 -0400 (EDT)
From: Tom Clarke <tclarke@uoguelph.ca>
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

 While the mechanism of Lamarck was the inheritance of aquired
 characteristics (and I admit my example on dog breeding was a poor
 choice), the overall point that Lamarck tried to make was that
 'lower' forms of life arose from inanimate matter and progressed
 towards a level of greater complexity and perfection; that is, that
 all things had an inherent drive towards greater complexity.
 For lamarck, the environment operated as the guiding force, directing
 the increase in complexity towards some end that would create the
 'perfect' organism.  While this sounds logical, its a bit different
 from natural selection in which the environment just removes those
 forms which don't work, allowing a number of possible solutions to
 and environmental 'problem'.

   Thinking over your message and previous ones, I find it hard
 to see how society and culture could be modelled in terms of evolution
 and natural selection.  While society does change, and it would be
 interesting to be able to predict the changes, I don't think
 evolution would be quite the right word for it.  Half the discussion
 on this list seems to deal in one sense or another with clarifying
 the definition of the term evolution, as quite a number of people have
 been using it in  a sloppy sense. Maybe Gould was right - evolution
 should be restricted to the life sciences and another term sought for
 the mechanisms that guide human culture.

  -Anax-

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:121>From huh@u.washington.edu  Tue Sep 14 16:49:45 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 13:24:51 -0700 (PDT)
From: Mark Rushing <huh@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: A reply to Ramsden
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Mon, 13 Sep 1993, Morris Simon wrote:

> On Wed, 8 Sep 1993, Peter Ramsden wrote:
>
> > I guess you missed the point.  I didn't want to know how you test a
> > taxonomy - I want to know how test your proposition that some taxonomy is
> > independent of human perception.  You may also want to be a bit more
> > careful about confusing the concept of perception with the concept of
> > will.  Just because I create a perception of something doesn't mean that I
> > "will into existence" the phenomenon I'm perceiving, does it?  A bit more
> > care in throwing around labels like 'science' and 'theology' wouldn't be
> > out of place either
>
> I think it would useful at this point in the thread to distinguish
> "perception" from "cognition". As most cognitive theorists as well as
> physiological psychologists use the term, "perception" is relatively
> cultureless until linguistic tags begin to segment and order physical
> phenomena. A perceiver never "creates" a perception, but the perceiver's
> cortex might modify the perception in order to force it into a learned
> category. "Will" is such a higher order process of mentation than either
> perception or cognitive processing that I find it difficult to use in this
> context. Perhaps theology and/or psychology would be a good place to leave
> such notions as 'willing phenomena into existence.'
>
> But then again, cognitive models such as the ubiquitous phylogenetic tree
> predispose analysts to interpret evolutionary continuity in terms of
> discontinuous 'branches,' 'clades' and 'species.' "Willingly?" 8*}
>
> Morris Simon <msimon7@ua1ix.ua.edu>
> Stillman College

sorry to have quoted two entire messages, but they seem to exemplify the
difficulties faced when communicating ideas across Disciplines.  whereas
peter's message is rooted (or not rooted) in a philosophical "flavour"
which is skeptical of, perhaps, the self-defining Terms of a scientific
Method for Understanding -- morris's message portrays a viewpoint which
has a deeply-rooted Belief in the Systematics of Science.

it is possible to nit-pick over Epistomology indefinately.  to dismiss a
viewpoint because it appears "Theological" since its foundation exists
outside of your personal Framework is, perhaps, somewhat hasty.  i believe
the question asked by peter is extremely valid for our time, and
especially in an interdisciplinary setting.  to say that a scientific
System exists independently of human perception or construction is to
almost have a belief in God.  to believe that we take part in a somewhat
defined System of perception and categorization focused in very specific areas
is, i believe, closer to understanding what Science is.

so, to peter's question -- is "some taxonomy...independent of human
perception"?  only if Something other than humanity created it, which does
not seem Reason-able at this time.  it seems to me that our only
verifyable premise is that we, as an Individual, sense what we sense.
anything more is a Construction in air, outside our sensual sphere which
is, perhaps, perceivable by Others, but certainly biased by the
Individuals sensory matrix, for lack of a better term.

unless you are willing to 'take a leap of Faith' into believing in
Absolute Constructs, we remain rooted in subjectivity, no matter how nicely
you might have your scientific Categories and logical Pathways arranged.
to quote morris:

	A perceiver never "creates" a perception, but the
	perceiver's cortex might modify the perception in order
	to force it into a learned category.  "Will" is such a
	higher order process of mentation than either perception
	or cognitive processing that I find it difficult to use
	in this context.

if i might presume to comment upon this well-plummed diagram -- a perceiver
perceives a perception.  that much i am certain we can agree upon, well,
more certain than i usually am...  the cortex might modify the perception
and force it into a learned category?  what?  this sounds as much a "higher
order process" as the term "Will" which was singled out in morris's
polite attack.  is it a mechanical process?  where do the "categories"
exist?  are they created by external stimuli, therefore learned?  or are
they shaped by the Individual who perceives?  is it out of the Perceiver's
control?

sorry to get ridiculous there, but i believe it is important in this
dicussion (a very fascinating one!) that we understand the inadequacies of
any one Systemic approach when dealing with concepts which, perhaps,
transcend any single Discipline.  it will require a tolerance of new
ideas, and a willingness to look beyond our own notions of This Is The Way
It Is.  what intriguing possibilities await us here!  (if we are willing
to throw down the gauntlets, permanently).  or is it that the strong do,
indeed, survive.

                  mark

           mark rushing
          post office box 85267
        seattle, washington  98145-1267

           206.329.8070
         huh@u.washington.edu
         rushing@battelle.org

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:122>From LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu  Tue Sep 14 18:46:59 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 93 18:47 CDT
From: J. Luke Matthews <LUKEMATT@macc.wisc.edu>
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Jeremy,
  you have misattributed someone else's comments to me (me being J. Luke
Matthews)...but be that as it may, let me ask the collective consciousness
here, how does the transmission of extranuclear DNA (in the form of replicons,
transposons, plasmids, etc) affect thinking about the transmission of acquired
characteristics? True enough, your run-of-the-mill Joe Shmoe E. coli may not
INTEND to acquire penicillin resistance, (so it may not be Lamarckian) but it
doesn't have to sit around waiting for its nucleotide sequence to change.

Luke Matthews

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:123>From D.Oldroyd@unsw.edu.au  Tue Sep 14 20:37:32 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 11:45:22 +1000
To: DARWIN-L@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: D.Oldroyd@unsw.edu.au
Subject: Neanderthals and Rhetoric!

I am working with a student on the question of the way in which
Neanderthals have been seen over time as human or non-human.  We are
interested in the way in which this question has been modulated by the use
of rhetoric and by different forms of pictorial representation.  If any
correspondents have any suggestions as to relevant references, either on
the history of ideas about the Neanderthals, or on the more general
question of the use of rhetoric in science (or better still
biology/palaeoanthropology), we should be most pleased to hear from you.
    Sincerely,
    David Oldroyd,
    School of Science and Technology Studies,
    University of New South Wales,
    Australia.
David Oldroyd,
School of Science and Technology Studies,
University of New South Wales

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:124>From DEWAR%UCONNVM.BITNET@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU  Tue Sep 14 22:01:05 1993

Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1993 22:57:08 -0500 (EST)
From: DEWAR%UCONNVM.BITNET@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU
Subject: Re: Neanderthals and Rhetoric!
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

The obvious place to start is a book recently published entitled "The Neanderta
ls" written by Erik Trinkhaus and Pat Shipman (I don't remember the order of th
e authorship).  They have a lengthy discussion of the history of representation
s of those poor souls.

Robert E. Dewar
Anthropology, University of Connecticut

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:125>From HOLSINGE@UCONNVM.BITNET  Wed Sep 15 06:50:24 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 07:37:24 -0500 (EST)
From: "Kent E. Holsinger" <HOLSINGE%UCONNVM.BITNET@KUHUB.CC.UKANS.EDU>
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Re: How does extranuclear transmission of DNA affect thinking about the
   transmission of acquired characteristics?

Not at all, I should say.  The fundamental distinction between what biologists
sometimes refer to as "soft" inheritance (inheritance of acquired characters)
and "hard" inheritance (transmission of hereditary material) is easiest to
explain in terms of the distinction Weismann made between germline and soma
(even though the distinction doesn't apply to plants).

Weismann noted that in animal development the cells that form the germ line
are differentiated from those that form the body (soma) early in development.
Using this observation he argued that transformations that affect only the
soma, the girth of a blacksmith's arm for example, will have no effect on the
germ line.  Therefore, these acquired characters will not be transmitted to
offspring.  Only mutations that alter the characteristics of the germ line
will be passed to offspring (regardless of whether they affect the soma of
the animal carrying the germline mutations).

Thus, the fundamental distinction is between inheritance of *environmentally
induced* somatic changes and inheritance of germ line changes.  The
transmission dynamics of extranuclear DNA, e.g., mitochondria and chloroplasts,
is quite different from that of nuclear DNA, but any changes in mitochondria
and chloroplasts are inherited only if they occur in the germ line.  In short,
transmission of extranuclear DNA is *non-Mendelian*, but it is not an example
of "soft" inheritance.

-- Kent E. Holsinger

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:126>From ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu  Wed Sep 15 07:28:59 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 08:35:21 -0500
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu (Jeremy John Ahouse)
Subject: Re: Neanderthals and Rhetoric!

you might want to take a look at:
AUTHOR: Landau, Misia, 1953-
TITLE: Narratives of human evolution
PUBLISHER: Yale University Press, c1991.
SUBJECTS: Human evolution. Anthropology, Prehistoric.
CALL NUMBER: GN281 .L354 1991

    - Jeremy

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:127>From p_stevens@nocmsmgw.harvard.edu  Wed Sep 15 07:40:53 1993

Date: 15 Sep 1993 08:40:39 U
From: "p stevens" <p_stevens@nocmsmgw.harvard.edu>
Subject: Simon, continuity, and trees
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Morris Simon writes - But then again, cognitive models such as the ubiquitous
phylogenetic tree predispose analysts to interpret evolutionary continuity
in terms of discontinuous 'branches,' 'clades' and 'species.' "Willingly?" 8*}

Perhaps, but the continuity in trees is via the trunk and branches, and in
evolution, is largely in the (extinct) past; much of extant diversity is
chunked up into more or less discrete bits.  Of course, there are possibilities
(rather limited) for hybridisation, and perhaps somewhat more extensive, but
unclear, for horizontal gene transfer by other mechanisms; also, in the
ultimate twigs of phylogenetic trees that are problems in deciding just what is
a twig and what is not.  Nevertheless, phylogenetic continuity is largely a
matter of history.

Peter Stevens.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:128>From T.J.M.Steele@southampton.ac.uk  Wed Sep 15 07:52:35 1993

From: "T.J.M.Steele" <T.J.M.Steele@southampton.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 13:31:22 BST
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Info. request - prosopagnosia

This is an info. request. Does anyone know where the suggestion was first made
that prosopagnosia - a pathology of the brain affecting recognition of
individual faces - was an evolved module enabling individuals to engage in
either kin-selected or reciprocal altruism? I'd be grateful for references, to
my own e-mail address and not to the List.

Self-intro.: I'm an archaeologist interested in brain evolution, evolutionary
psychology, and cultural transmission theory. Currently working on modelling
cultural diffusion through structured social networks (graph theory
application).

Thanks.

James Steele
Department of Archaeology
University of Southampton
Highfield
Southampton S09 5NH
U.K.

E-Mail: tjms@uk.ac.southampton

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:129>From JLV@tusk.gc.edu  Wed Sep 15 07:54:20 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 7:55:54 -0500 (CDT)
From: JLV@tusk.gc.edu (Jesse Vaughan)
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

My understanding of evolution comes from a background in paleontology.  As
I see it, evolution is the observation that the oldest rocks contain the
remains of the simplest organisms and that progressively younger rocks
contain the remains of progressively more complex organisms.  Evolution,
then, boils down to the FACT that "things change."  Maybe we geologists and
paleontologists assume this, and tend to SAY "evolution" when we actually
MEAN "processes or mechanisms that have resulted in evolution."  When
speaking to fellow geologists/paleontologists, each of us understands the
assumption.

What is not completely understood, and that makes for lively discussions,
are these processes or mechanisms.  Any discussion of what CAUSED the
change should be separated from the FACT that things have changed.  If we
do this, there should be no reason to restrict the term "evolution" to the
life sciences.  Cultures do undergo evolution, but the processes behind
that evolution are obviously different from the processes of organic
evolution in the paleontological sense.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:130>From ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu  Wed Sep 15 09:21:52 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 10:28:21 -0500
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu (Jeremy John Ahouse)
Subject: Evolution and its mechanisms

    Jesse Vaughan correctly encourages us to make a distinction between
the processes and mechanisms that make evolution possible and the
observation of change over time.

    Tom Clarke seemed to conflate these 2 especially in relation to
using Lamarck as the poster child for a notion that these changes are
progressive.  This part of Lamarck's point of view is the part that
*hasn't* been eschewed by some evolutionists and some do think that
evolution (even by committed selectionists) is progressive.  There are also
other more "new age" strains trying to explain this increase in complexity
(Stu Kauffman's _The Origins of Order_, Steve Stanley's Hierarchy theory,
Brooks and Wiley's Entropy stuff...) and also strong advocates against this
progressivist strain (Gould _Wonderful Life_, most protozoologists,
etc...).

    I would like to hear where folks on this list stand in relation to
the notion of progressiveness in evolution.  It seems to be part of the
myth of modernity that (human) culture is progressive but what do you all
think about the biological case.

    - Jeremy

    :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
    Jeremy John Ahouse
    Biology Dept. & Center for Complex Systems
    Brandeis University
    Waltham, MA 02254-9110

    (617) 736-4954
    email: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:131>From DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu  Wed Sep 15 10:02:54 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 11:03:21 -0400 (EDT)
From: DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu
Subject: A "progress" bibliography?
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Organization: University of NC at Greensboro

I concur with Jeremy Ahouse's impression of some of the current work being
done on the notion of complexity in relation to evolution.  Jeremy asks what
people's opinions are on the progress issue generally.  There was some
discussion on this topic right after the list opened, and I must confess that
I find a lot of discussion on this topic to be fuzzy and not always helpful.
Unless people are very careful to disentangle a variety of terms including
order, complexity, progress, the meanings of "higher" and "lower", and on and
on, discussion of the topic usually isn't fruitful.  It's also important to
distinguish between what any one may believe "progress" and its allies means
today, and what different people have taken these terms to mean in the past.

I suggested that before we dive into this dark thicket, it might be helpful
to have some solid bibliographic guidance, and proposed that some readers
might like to put together an annotated bibliography on the topic of progress
in various historical sciences.  We haven't had any takers yet, but the offer
is still open.  Here are some starters:


Nitecki, Matthew, ed.  1988.  Evolutionary Progress.  Univ. Chicago Press.
  [A volume of papers on different aspects of "progress" in evolution.]

Lass, Roger.  1980.  On Explaining Language Change.  Cambridge Univ. Press.

Aitchison, Jean.  1991.  Language Change: Progress or Decay?  Cambridge Univ.
Press.


George Gale kindly contributed these two a few days ago:

"An extremely useful account of change vs. evolution vs. progress, and all
the other synonyms, is to be found in "The Concept of Biological Progress",
by Francisco Ayala, in _Studies in the Philosophy of Biology_, Ayala and
Dobzhansky, U.C. press.  An even more general discussion, perhaps more useful
because of it, is William Dray, _Philosophy of History_, Prentice-Hall, Ch.
5."


And here's one of mine in which I argue that the notion of evolutionary
progress is an artifact of our (human) psychology and how it perceives
biological diversity:

O'Hara, Robert J.  1992.  Telling the tree: narrative representation and the
study of evolutionary history.  Biology and Philosophy, 7:135-160.


Bob O'Hara, Darwin-L list owner

Robert J. O'Hara (darwin@iris.uncg.edu)
Center for Critical Inquiry and Department of Biology
100 Foust Building, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Greensboro, North Carolina 27412 U.S.A.

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<1:132>From Q.Mackie@southampton.ac.uk  Wed Sep 15 10:22:22 1993

From: "Q.Mackie" <Q.Mackie@southampton.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 16:08:16 BST
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Neanderthal depictions

Re:  Portrayals of Neanderthals in Art, etc.....

See Chris Stringer and Clive Gamble "In Search of the Neanderthals" Thames
and Hudson 1993, which has a chapter on this. Might not be published outside
UK yet.

Also see Stephanie Moser's article in a recent (last 12 months) Antiquity on
similar material.

Quentin Mackie
Dept. Archaeology
U. Southampton
Southampton UK
SO9 5NH

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<1:133>From AVW@PSUVM.PSU.EDU  Wed Sep 15 12:53:08 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 13:54 -0400 (EDT)
From: AVW@PSUVM.PSU.EDU
Subject: Re: Evolution and its mechanisms
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

As a geographer, I see distinction between the fact of change and speculation
about mechanisms as sensible.  Principles of equifinality imply (many?) routeS
from one pattern to another could exist.  The science comes in gathering
evidence for most likely one(s).

There is I think confusion, at least at lay levels, between the reality of
greater complexity of organization and behavior and the idea of progress.
In many cases, the first is seen to mean the latter.  The dictionary meaning
of EVOLUTION can itself mislead.  Can organisms evolve into simpler structures?

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<1:134>From tclarke@uoguelph.ca  Wed Sep 15 15:44:46 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 16:32:37 -0400 (EDT)
From: Tom Clarke <tclarke@uoguelph.ca>
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

On Wed, 15 Sep 1993, Jesse Vaughan wrote:

> My understanding of evolution comes from a background in paleontology.  As
> I see it, evolution is the observation that the oldest rocks contain the
> remains of the simplest organisms and that progressively younger rocks
> contain the remains of progressively more complex organisms.  Evolution,
> then, boils down to the FACT that "things change."  Maybe we geologists and
> paleontologists assume this, and tend to SAY "evolution" when we actually
> MEAN "processes or mechanisms that have resulted in evolution."  When
> speaking to fellow geologists/paleontologists, each of us understands the
> assumption.

  When I step on a beetle, 'things change' in a rather drastic way,
 but that isn't evolution.  The organic sense of evolution is a change
 in the allele frequencies of a population...  the other senses of
 evolution I don't feel are really 'evolution' for a variety of
 reasons.  As for the progression from simple to complex, I could
 show you a whole host of insects that for one reason or another have
 gone from a complex 'generalist' form to a comparatively simple
 'specialist' form.  If complexity is not selected for (and complexity
 tends to be energetically expensive) it will disappear.  It could
 be argued that in fact the trend is towards simplicity and not
 complexity as highly complex organisms lose unneeded aspects of
 their morphology and behavioral repitoire as they specialise into
 particular niches.  Parasites and parasitoids are good examples of
 this loss in complexity.

   On the other hand I remember reading something to the effect that
 generalist species do better in the long run then specialist species...

  -Anax-

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<1:135>From GGALE@VAX1.UMKC.EDU  Wed Sep 15 17:05:37 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1993 17:01:59 -0500 (CDT)
From: GGALE@VAX1.UMKC.EDU
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

Folks,
I keep getting confused when people refer to things like "species x
gets simpler" or "species x is becoming more specialized".
Isn't the point of almost all descriptive terms of this sort that they
are *relational* terms, and not simple property terms?? [e.g., more like
"to the left of" or "taller", than like "spherical" or "red"]
"Simpler" or "more specialized" must be estimated with respect to the
moving target presented by the environment, or so I always thought...

George
ggale@vax1.umkc.edu

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<1:136>From barryr@ucmp1.Berkeley.EDU  Wed Sep 15 19:44:35 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 17:47:24 PDT
From: barryr@ucmp1.Berkeley.EDU (Barry Roth)
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Ideas of progress in systematics/evolution

Ideas of "progress" in one form or another _infuse_ systematic zoology (at
least the corner I am familiar with -- terrestrial mollusks).  In cladisti-
cally analyzing your group, work through character-state argumentation ac-
cording to one of the modern protocols (e.g., outgroup comparison).  Then
compare your results to those of the old-timers and ask yourself how did
they come up with their ideas of character-state polarity.  It may not be
quite as blatant as with Henry Hemphill, who wrote around the turn of the
Century, "Westward the course of Empire takes its way -- no less so in the
natural world than in human affairs" (he was mainly talking biogeography,
but systematics was in there too); but culture-driven decisions are really
common, and still exert an effect on the classifications we use every day.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:137>From ronald@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu  Wed Sep 15 20:50:31 1993

Date: Wed, 15 Sep 93 15:40:52 HST
From: Ron Amundson <ronald@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.Edu>
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change

> "Simpler" or "more specialized" must be estimated with respect to the
> moving target presented by the environment, or so I always thought...
>
> George
> ggale@vax1.umkc.edu

There are several sorts of comparative terms.  Some are relativized to
the environment; "specialized" indicates a derived change adapted to a
(relatively) small portion of the full environment.  Darwin's moth
with the 6" proboscis counts as specialized partly because few flowers
have their pollen stored 6" down a tube -- if all flowers did, then
the moth would not be "specialized".  Methane metabolizing bacteria
are adapted to a small part of the environment, but we would not call
them "specialized" because oxygen metabolizing bacteria descended from
them.  Oxygen metabolism might once have been a "specialized" trait --
until an oxygen rich atmosphere covered the planet).

"Primitive" is a term used sometimes by systematists as a synonym for
an ancestral condition of a certain trait.  It is misunderstood
popularly to mean simpler, or less "highly" evolved.  In this sense a
primitive trait may be simpler, more complex, more generalized, or
more specialized.  The comparisons are only between ancestral and
derived conditions of the trait, and the environment is not involved
in the definition.

While I'm generally skeptical about classifications of higher and
lower, there are some objective ones.  Complexity can be judged, for
example, by counting the number of distinct tissue types in a species.
Stuart Kauffman does this in The Origins of Order, and in a recent
Scientific American article.

Ron Amundson
ronald@uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:138>From DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu  Wed Sep 15 23:45:17 1993

Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 00:45:49 -0400 (EDT)
From: DARWIN@iris.uncg.edu
Subject: Revised WELCOME message now available
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Organization: University of NC at Greensboro

Greetings to all Darwin-L subscribers.  Our group now has over 450 members
from more than 30 countries, and we continue to grow.  I have revised the
welcome message sent to new subscribers in the light of some of the questions
and problems that have arisen during our first couple of weeks, and I
encourage everyone to retrieve a copy of it for reference.  It now contains
a full summary of the most common listserv commands, including information
on how to set your mail to digest format and how to review the list of
current subscribers.  To get a copy of this new welcome message you do
NOT need to cancel your subscription and re-subscribe.  You may simply
send the one-line message:

   INFO DARWIN-L

to listserv@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu, and the listserv program will mail you
a copy of the new welcome message.

I thank you all for your continuing interest in Darwin-L.

Bob O'Hara, Darwin-L list owner

Robert J. O'Hara (darwin@iris.uncg.edu)
Center for Critical Inquiry and Department of Biology
100 Foust Building, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Greensboro, North Carolina 27412 U.S.A.

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:139>From ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu  Thu Sep 16 07:58:06 1993

Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 09:04:37 -0500
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
From: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu (Jeremy John Ahouse)
Subject: Taxonomy and directedness

Barry Roth wrote:
"Ideas of "progress" in one form or another _infuse_ systematic zoology (at
least the corner I am familiar with -- terrestrial mollusks).  In cladisti-
cally analyzing your group, work through character-state argumentation ac-
cording to one of the modern protocols (e.g., outgroup comparison).  Then
compare your results to those of the old-timers and ask yourself how did
they come up with their ideas of character-state polarity.  It may not be
quite as blatant as with Henry Hemphill, who wrote around the turn of the
Century, "Westward the course of Empire takes its way -- no less so in the
natural world than in human affairs" (he was mainly talking biogeography,
but systematics was in there too); but culture-driven decisions are really
common, and still exert an effect on the classifications we use every day."

Then Stan Salthe forwarded this to me:

from Foucault, q.i. Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge
..This passage quotes a certain Chinese encyclopedia in
which it is written that animals are divided into

    belonging to the Emperor
    embalmed
    tame
    sucking pigs
    sirens
    fabulous
    stray dogs
    included in the present classification
    frenzied
    innumerable
    drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush
    et cetera
    having just broken the water pitcher
    that from a long way off look like flies

"In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing that, by means of this
fable,  we apprehend in one great leap, is demonstrated as the charm of
another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark
impossibility of thinking THAT."

    The putative Chinese taxonomy above didn't feel right to me.  This
got me to thinking about what I want from a taxonomy... which may not be
what nature has to offer.  To organize the world and drop it into the
appropriate bins I want a nested hierarchy of non-overlapping sets with a
minimum of grabage pail categories (this cashes out as categories that you
gain membership to by having characteristics rather than lacking
characteristics; compare "et cetera" and "sucking pigs" or "invertebrates"
and "angiosperms").  Cladistics insists that as a first pass we assume a
nested hierarchy (which comes from bifurcations without "lateral" transfer
of traits).  This is certainly an appealing position and also seems to be
realized in many taxa.
    In language or cultural evolution the desire for this kind of
classification is still great, but I don't see that the underlying
mechanisms support it (especially the assumption of little lateral
transfer).  Now how does progress get wrapped around all of this?  I like
the atemporal position that cladograms take, but notions of progress
require that time be reintroduced to the classification.  Any suggestions
for a coherent way to do this?  Is it just sneaking in through the
polarization of character states (as Barry Roth implies)?  So that my
nested hierarchy of non-overlapping sets has a progressivist agenda "built
in" to its fabric?
    Finally I do find the alternate classification expanding.  And I do
see that it opens up the possibility for questions that I might not have
asked.  And in this way I can see the utility of many alternate taxonomies,
whether or not they reflect underlying mechanisms... and they do offer the
possibility that multiple underlying mechanisms might be at work and a
particular classification may privelege only some of these.

    - Jeremy

    :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
    Jeremy John Ahouse
    Biology Dept. & Center for Complex Systems
    Brandeis University
    Waltham, MA 02254-9110
    (617) 736-4954
    email by Eudora on the Mac: ahouse@hydra.rose.brandeis.edu

_______________________________________________________________________________

<1:140>From LANGDON@GANDLF.UINDY.EDU  Thu Sep 16 08:21:55 1993

Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1993 08:21:55 -0500
From: "JOHN LANGDON"  <LANGDON@GANDLF.UINDY.EDU>
To: darwin-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
Subject: Re: Lamarkianism in linguistic change

In message <Pine.3.07.9309151636.A6382-b100000@irwin.cs.uoguelph.ca>  writes:

>  As for the progression from simple to complex, I could
>  show you a whole host of insects that for one reason or another have
>  gone from a complex 'generalist' form to a comparatively simple
>  'specialist' form.  If complexity is not selected for (and complexity
>  tends to be energetically expensive) it will disappear.  It could
>  be argued that in fact the trend is towards simplicity and not
>  complexity as highly complex organisms lose unneeded aspects of
>  their morphology and behavioral repitoire as they specialise into
>  particular niches.  Parasites and parasitoids are good examples of
>  this loss in complexity.
>
>  On the other hand I remember reading something to the effect that
>  generalist species do better in the long run then specialist species...

I don't think that generality and specialization represent the same spectrum as
simplicity/complexity. I have found that generality generally means selection
to maintain a compromise morphology, satisfying many competing functional
demands simultaneously to some degree of effectiveness. Specialization
represents a shift along the spectrum of compromise so that some demands of
increasing importance are met more effectively and others, of decreasing or
vanishing importance, are met less effectively. For example, in the evolution
of the catarrhine foot, primitive generality meant a broad spectrum of
potential behaviors in a broad range of substrates (climbing, walking, running,
etc.) while later specialization emphasized EITHER slower climbing (apes) OR
running/leaping (monkeys) at the cost of the other. I don't see these as
changes in level of complexity.

The evolutionary trend is toward specialization in many cases when competition
demands greater effectiveness of a particular function and/or when the
environment is stable and uniform enough to favor a narrower niche over a long
period of time. Generality is favored if the environment is changing or the
niche is broad, because of the potential for resource switching and, in the
long run, because the generalists have a greater potential for specializing to
meet a different environment.

I don't think this informs the discussion on complexity.

JOHN H. LANGDON         email  langdon@gandlf.uindy.edu
DEPARTMENT OF BIOLOGY       phone (317) 788-3447
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANAPOLIS      FAX   (317) 788-3569
1400 EAST HANNA AVENUE
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 46227

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Darwin-L Message Log 1: 106-140 -- September 1993                           End